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INTRODUCTION
In less than two years, federal government spectrum auctions have
generated more than $20 billion in revenue through the sale of 2745
licenses, a remarkable amount' considering that radio frequencies are a
resource that were always awarded without charge and still are for many
users. In 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted
the first auction of licenses for electromagnetic radio frequency spectrum
(spectrum). Since then, as illustrated in Appendix A: Summary Results of
Spectrum Auctions, the FCC has completed eight spectrum auctions of ten-
year licenses for narrowband and broadband personal communication
services (PCS), direct broadcast satellite (DBS), multipoint distribution
service (MDS), and specialized mobile radio (SMR) using the preferred
auction method of simultaneous multiple round electronic (SMRE)
bidding.2 The federal government earned $19.4 billion in net revenue from
1. $20 billion represents $205 per household (97.3 million in 1994) or $77 per resident
(260.3 million in 1994) in the United States. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1995, at 65, Table 2 (1996).
2. PCS consists of a family of land-based, two-way mobile communications services
divided into narrowband services (e.g., paging) and broadband services (e.g., telephone).
DBS provides satellite-based direct delivery of television programming to 18-inch receiver
dish antennas. MDS is a land-based wireless cable service received on wire antennas- SMR
consists of private dispatch communications and is used largely in the construction, service,
and transportation industries. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS & INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, SPEC. PUB. 94-31, U.S. NATIONAL
SPECTRUM REQUIREMENTS: PROJECTIONS AND TRENDS, 13, 21, 101 (1995).
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the winning SMRE bidders.3 In February and June 1995, the FCC
awarded four "pioneer preference" licenses for $735 million based upon
the narrowband and broadband PCS results.4 The July 1994 "oral outcry"
auction of 493 five-year licenses for interactive video and data services
(IVDS) produced an additional $214 million.' Appendix A: Summary
Results of Spectrum Auctions illustrates the cumulative total of $20.4 billion
in net revenue for 2745 licences, a considerable new source of revenue for
the U.S. Treasury.
Clearly, the spectrum auctions, under the FCC's preferred auction
method of SMRE bidding, have generated unprecedented public revenue.
3. The FCC has completed eight SMRE auctions for 10 nationwide narrowband PCS
licenses earning $617 million, 30 regional narrowband PCS licenses earning $395 million,
99 MTA A/B block broadband PCS licenses earning $7.034 billion, a 1 10-degree orbit DBS
license earning $683 million, a 148-degree orbit DBS license earning $52 million, 493 BTA
MDS licenses earning $216 million, 1020 MTA 900 MHz SMR licenses earning $204
million, and 493 BTA C block broadband PCS licenses earning $10.217 billion.
Announcing the High Bidders in the Auction of Ten Nationwide Narrowband PCS Licenses;
Winning Bids Total $617,006,674, Public Notice (Aug. 2, 1994) (nationwide narrowband
PCS); FCC Announces Results of PCS Regional NarrowbandLicense Auction, FCC News,
Nov. 8, 1994, at 1 (regional narrowband PCS); Commercial Mobile Radio Service
Information Announcing the Winning Bidders in the FCC's Auction of 99 Licenses To
Provide Broadband PCS in Major Trading Areas: Down Payments Due March 20, 1995,
Public Notice (Mar. 13, 1995) (A/B block broadband PCS); MCI Telecommunications
Corporation Bids $682,500,000 for Last Available Nationwide DBS Slot, FCC News, Jan.
25, 1996, at 1. (110 degree orbit DBS); Echostar DBS Corporation Wins 24 DBS Channels
at the 148 Degree Orbital Location with a High Bid of $52,295,000, FCC News, Jan. 26,
1996, at 1-2 (148 degree orbit DBS); FCC ADS Auction: Final Results, FCC WWW,
http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/6_cursum.gif (Mar. 4, 1996); FCC 900 MHz SAR Auction: Final
Results, FCC WWW, http://www.fcc.gov/wtb7_cursum.gif (Apr. 15, 1996); FCC C-Block
Auction: FinalResults, FCC WWW, http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/5_cursum.gif (May 10, 1996).
MTA, BTA, and MSA/RSA are standard terms used to define the U.S. geographically. In
the spectrum auctions, the FCC has used three standard systems to define the geographic
scope of the licenses: (a) 51 Metropolitan Trading Areas (MTAs), (b) 493 Basic Trading
Areas (BTAs), and (c) 306 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and 428 Rural Statistical
Areas (RSAs). The FCC has also used a nonstandard system for defining 30 regional areas.
See infra Appendix A (identifying geographic scope of licenses).
4. The FCC awarded four pioneer preferences, a nationwide narrowband PCS license
earning $33 million and three MTA A block broadband PCS licenses earning $702 million,
at substantial discounts off the average price paid at the respective SMRE auction. In re
Amendment ofthe Commission's Rules to establish New Narrowband Personal Communica-
tions Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 1309, 74 Rad. Reg. 2d 822
(P & F) (1994) (pioneer preferences-A block broadband PCS); Personal Communications
Service Information Narrowband-Nationwide, Public Notice (Feb. 1, 1995) (pioneer
preference-nationwide narrowband PCS).
5. Private Radio Bureau Licensing Information 472 Applicants to Bid on Approximate-
ly 600 Interactive Video and Data Services (IVDS) Licenses, Public Notice (Jul. 20, 1994);
Announcing High Bidders for 594 Interactive Video and Data Service (IVDS) Licenses,
Public Notice (Aug. 2, 1994).
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But will the auctions as administered by the FCC result in an optimal use
of electromagnetic spectrum? If not, are better alternatives available?
This Comment will analyze' the allocation and assignment of
electromagnetic spectrum licenses for commercial use through competitive
bidding (auctions) as authorized under Sections 921 to 927 of the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization Act
(NTIAO Act)6 and Section 3090) of the Communications Act of 1934. 7
Five aspects will be covered. Part I describes the statutory mandate for
reallocation and competitive bidding provided to the Department of
Commerce and the FCC. Part II explains the physical properties of
spectrum and its applications to wireless communications technologies,
products, and services. Part III examines five methods of assignment used
by or available to the FCC. Part IV explores seven auction methods and
their relative appeal and application to FCC objectives. Part V reviews the
FCC's preferred auction method of SMRE bidding and recommends a
policy reorientation to promote spectrum capacity and a return to user fees.
I. CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE
A. Competitive Bidding and Reallocation
Under Title VI of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,1
Congress, to promote the efficient use and public benefit of commercially
usable spectrum, authorized two significant changes in the allocation and
assignment of electromagnetic radio frequency spectrum. First, Congress
amended the NTIAO Act to direct the Department of Commerce's National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), 9 to identify
6. National Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization Act,
Pub. L. No. 102-538, 106 Stat. 3553 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 921-27 (1988)).
7. 15 U.S.C.A. § 309(j) (West Supp. 1995).
8. Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 6001-02, 107 Stat. 379, 379-401 (1993) (to be codified at
47 U.S.C. §§ 309(i) & (j), 922-27).
9. Section 305 of the Communications Act authorizes the president to assign
frequencies to the federal government. Under Executive Order 12,046, the president
delegated federal government spectrum management authority to the Department of
Commerce. 43 Fed. Reg. 13,349 (1978). The NTIA, an organization within the Department
of Commerce, manages federal government spectrum use through its Office of Spectrum
Management (OSM). Under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the Frequency
Management Advisory Council (FMAC), consisting of 15 members appointed by the
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information (also the
Administrator of the NTIA), reports to the Secretary of Commerce through the Assistant
Secretary and provides advice on major spectrum management issues including the
implementation of new spectrum conserving technology. Federal Advisory Committee Act,
Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (Oct. 6, 1972). U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONSAND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, SPEC. PuB. 88-21,
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and transfer federal government spectrum to the FCC for reallocation to
nonfederal commercial use. Second, Congress created Section 3090) of the
Communications Act to require the FCC to employ competitive bidding
under specified conditions in the assignment of spectrum for emerging
telecommunications technologies. Together these two acts sought to
promote emerging telecommunications technologies: (1) through realloca-
tion to make spectrum available for commercial use, and (2) through the
market mechanism of competitive bidding to ensure the award of licenses
to those products, services, and technology offering the greatest benefits to
society.'
B. NTIAO Amendment
The NTIAO Amendment provided for competitive bidding of
electromagnetic spectrum by requiring the planning, identification, and
distribution of frequencies designated for federal government use to
nonfederal commercial uses. 1 This was accomplished in two stages.
First, in February 1994, the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary)
submitted a preliminary report to Congress and President Clinton. 2 The
preliminary report (1) identified qualified reallocable frequency bands, (2)
recommended the immediate reallocation of more than 50 MHz of spectrum
below 5 gigahertz (GHz), including 25 MHz below 3 GHz, for exclusive
nonfederal uses, (3) sought public comment on the report, and (4) provided
for direct discussion between commercial representatives and federal
spectrum users. 3 As required, the schedule considered pressing need,
NTIA TELECOM 2000: CHARTING THE COURSE FOR A NEW CENTURY 656-57, 659-61
(1988) [hereinafter NTIA TELECOM 2000].
10. Congress mandated these changes through two acts: the Emerging Telecommunica-
tions Technologies Act of 1993, which amended the NTIAO Act, and the Licensing
Improvement Act of 1993, which amended the Communications Act to create § 309(i) and
(j). While these two changes were effected through the same legislative act and share
common principles and goals, § 3090) only mandates that the FCC issue licenses and
permits through competitive bidding for 10 MHz of spectrum reassigned from federal
government use. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309G)(9) (1995).
11. The Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information and the Chairman of
the FCC must conduct joint spectrum planning for the issuing of licenses under § 3090) and
the sharing of spectrum between federal and nonfederal uses. 47 U.S.C.A. § 922 (1995);
HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 245, 264-65
(1993).
12. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, SPEC. PUB. 94-27, PRELIMINARY SPECTRUM REALLOCA-
TION REPORT inside cover (1994) [hereinafter NTIA PRELIMINARY REALLOCATION].
13. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 923(d)(1)-(2), (d)(4), (e)(2) (West 1995); NTIA PRELIMINARY
REALLOCATION, supra note 12, at inside cover (providing preliminary identification of
federal government spectrum that could be made available for reallocation to nonfederal
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residual equipment life, international coordination, 14 relative federal costs,
and commercial benefits. 5 Six months later, the FCC submitted to the
Secretary an analysis of public comments to the preliminary report,
including the FCC's response to the comments, 6 and the NTIA withdrew
federal assignments for the 50 MHz of frequencies designated for
immediate reallocation.'
7
Second, in February 1995, the Secretary presented to Congress and
President Clinton a final report identifying and recommending additional
frequency bands to reallocate. 8 Those bands (1) were previously allocated
on a primary basis to the federal government; (2) were not foreseeably
needed by the federal government; (3) were available for transfer within
fifteen years; (4) would not result in excessive public cost or loss of
services or benefits in relation to the potential benefits attributed to the
users; inviting interested parties to submit written comments by May 11, 1994; announcing
that NTIA staff will meet with the public to answer questions on the preliminary report on
April 7, 1994 at the NTIA offices in Washington, D.C.; and sponsoring a series of
meetings between federal government users of the proposed spectrum and commercial
representatives beginning on June 24, 1994 at its offices in Washington, D.C.); U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL TELECOMNUCATIONS AND INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, SPEC. PUB. 95-32, SPECTRUM REALLOCATIONFINAL REPORT 1-3 (1995)
[hereinafter NTIA REALLOCATION FINAL] (reporting that the NTIA received 51 written
comments, conducted two public meetings, and met with 17 of the commenters to "obtain
further expert analysis of the technical, regulatory, and commercial issues addressed in the
Preliminary Report").
14. International coordination is often conducted through the International Telecommu-
nications Union (ITU), a specialized United Nations agency serving as a treaty organization
for its 160 member nations. The ITU maintains an international structure, including a Table
of Frequency Allocations recorded with the International Frequency Registration Board
(IFBR), similar to the U.S. Table of Assignments, to promote efficient and orderly
worldwide telecommunications. The Department of State, NTIA, and FCC are responsible
for international spectrum negotiations related to U.S. national and foreign policy. NTIA
TELECOM 2000, supra note 9, at 655-56; Christian A. Herter, Jr., The Electromagnetic
Spectrum: A Critical Natural Resource, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 651, 657-59 (1985).
15. 47 U.S.C.A. § 923(e)(3) (1995).
16. 47 U.S.C.A. § 923(d)(3) (1995); FCC, REPORT FROM THE FCC TO RONALD H.
BROWN, SECRETARY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REGARDING THE NTIA PRELIMINARY
SPECTRUM ALLOCATION, 9 FCC Rcd. 6793 (1994) (analyzing the public comments of
preliminary report).
17. Memorandum from William Gamble, NTIA Deputy Associate Administrator, to
NTIA Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee, IRAC Doc. 28880 (August 9, 1994)
reported in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, SPEC. PUB. 95-32, SPECTRUM REALLOCATION FINAL
REPORT 1-3 (1995) (withdrawing assignments to the federal government for 2390-2400
MHz, 2402-2417 MHz, and 4660-4685 MHz, but providing for continued federal use on
a noninterference basis with nonfederal use, while not used during the FCC's reallocation
and assignment plan).
18. NTIA REALLOCATION FINAL, supra note 13, at iii.
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public by nonfederal use; and (5) had the greatest potential for productive
uses and public benefits.19 Simultaneously, the Secretary also recommend-
ed to Congress and President Clinton the reallocation of more than 200
MHz of commercially viable spectrum below 5 GHz, including 100 MHz
of commercially attractive spectrum below 3 GHz. ° The plan included
mixed-use frequency bands where potential use of federal stations was
"substantially less" than that of nonfederal stations.2
Title VI specifically permitted both the Department of Commerce and
the FCC to go beyond the required elements of the plan.' As summarized
in Appendix B: Overiew of Spectrum Reallocation Requirements and Final
Plan,13 the NTIA's final plan exceeded the maximum requirements of
Title VI for total, exclusive and below 3 GHz spectrum.
C. Section 309()
Section 3090) mandated a detailed framework and timetable for FCC
allocation of spectrum licenses. Congress sought to achieve several
objectives including: (1) development and rapid deployment of new
technology, products, and services, (2) promotion of economic opportunity,
competition, and consumer access, (3) avoidance of unjust enrichment, and
(4) efficient and intensive use of spectrum.'
Section 309(j) has five key elements. First, the FCC is authorized to
conduct competitive bidding for mutually exclusive applications of initial
license or construction permits where the licensee will receive compensa-
19. NTIA REALLOCATIONFINAL, supra note 13, at 1-3; 47 U.S.C.A. § 923(a) (West
1995). Title VI mandated specific criteria. Foreseeable need shall include consideration of
commercially available substitutes, frequency sharing, new technologies, nonradiating
communications, degradation of federal operations, and excessive federal costs. Feasible
availability will be determined assuming scientific progress, demand growth, and
displacement costs. Productive use shall include consideration of equipment capabilities,
assigned frequency proximity, and foreign government action. Id. § 923(c)(1)-(3). While
Congress acknowledged that reallocation would impose costs on federal agencies, except
where the president reclaimed reassigned frequencies, Title VI did not provide a mechanism
to compensate federal agencies for the $500 to $600 million, or possibly as much as $1.3
billion, in estimated reallocation costs. NTIA REALLOCATION FINAL, supra note 13, at vii,
3-3, 5-7 (summarizing the costs for the 15-year period defined by Title VI as provided by
the 10 affected agencies).
20. NTIA REALLOCATION FINAL, supra note 13, at iv (presenting a final spectrum
reallocation plan for 235 MHz total spectrum including 135 MHz below 3 GHz).
21. 47 U.S.C.A. § 923(b) (1995); NTIA REALLOCATION FINAL, supra note 13, at iv.
22. In addition, the FCC may make frequency allocations and license assignments not
included in the final plan as well as make changes in the plan. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 925(b)(5),
927(b) (1995). NTIA REALLOCATION FINAL, supra note 13, at iv (reallocating 102 MHz
for exclusive nonfederal use, and 52 MHz and 133 MHz for mixed use).
23. See infra p. 539.
24. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 925(b)(5), 927(b) (West 1995).
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tion from subscribers (subscriber fees) for the receipt or transmission of
signals over a licensed frequency. 5 Second, the FCC must develop a
bidding methodology for each class of licenses as well as design and test
multiple alternative auction methodologies. Third, the FCC must establish
safeguards to protect the public interest in the selection of classes to be
used for bidding, eligibility, and methodology.' Fourth, the FCC is to
avoid license concentration, provide licenses to small businesses, rural
telephone companies, minority- and women-owned businesses, and recover
a portion of the value conferred in public spectrum use.' Finally, Section
309()(4) specifically authorizes the FCC's use of alternative payment
schedules, tax certificates, bidding preferences, antitrafficking restrictions,
transfer disclosures, performance requirements, area designation, and
bandwidth assignments.'
Although the House Committee on Energy and Commerce expected
revenues of $7.2 billion over five years, 29 Congress specifically limited
consideration of revenues. Congress prohibited the assignment of
bandwidth, frequency, or power limitations where a finding of public
interest, convenience, and necessity was based on the expectation of federal
revenues.3" In addition, federal revenue considerations could not be the
sole or predominant reason to enact payment schedule regulation."
However, Congress allowed the FCC in such situtations to consider
consumer demand32 and permitted the FCC to retain a portion of the
proceeds generated by competitive bidding."3 Together, these sections
sought to insulate FCC policy decisions from budgetary pressures.3
In Section 309(0), Congress set forth an aggressive timetable to
conduct spectrum auctions. As required, the FCC issued a final PCS report
and order,35 regulations to implement Section 309(), 36 and PCS licenses
25. Id. § 309()(1)-(2).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. § 309()(4).
29. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 11, at 252.
30. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309()(7)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
31. Id. § 309()(7)(B).
32. Id. § 309()(7)(C).
33. Id. § 309()(8).
34. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 11, at 252.
35. In re Implementation of Section 309(0) of the Communications Act Competitive
Bidding, First Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 7373 (1994).
36. In re Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act Competitive
Bidding, Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 2348 (1994).
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and permits37 in, respectively, February, March, and May of 1994. In
addition, the authority to issue licenses or permits under competitive
bidding remained contingent upon the completion of the Department of
Commerce's preliminary reallocation report, the FCC's rule making for
PCS, and an FCC plan for ensuring adequate availability of frequencies for
public safety licenses. In September 1997, a year prior to the expiration of
authority, the FCC must report to Congress on all revenues obtained and
expected, the methodologies used and their relative advantages and
disadvantages, the statutory requirements of efficiency and effectiveness,
the introduction of new technologies and companies, the timely launch of
rural service, the participation of small businesses, rural telephone
companies, minority- and women-owned businesses, and the statutory
changes needed to improve the competitive bidding process." Finally, by
August 1998, the FCC must issue licenses and permits through competitive
bidding for at least 10 MHz of spectrum reassigned from federal govern-
ment use.39 Competitive bidding authority expires in September 1998.' o
Together, the NTIAO Amendment and Section 3090) provide
spectrum resources and the management structure of competitive bidding
to promote spectrum utility. However, Section 3090) leaves much
discretion in the design of the assignment mechanism. In part, this may
reflect congressional confidence in market mechanisms. More importantly,
it reflects the physical character of the resource being allocated. What are
the properties of electromagnetic spectrum that foster market allocation and
assignment schemes as the means to achieve optimal utility and efficiency?
I. A NATURAL AND NATIONAL RESOURCE
A. Physical Properties
The economic rationale of competitive bidding for the assignment of
electromagnetic spectrum develops from its physical properties. Electro-
magnetic spectrum is a limited natural resource with unique physical
properties. Effective management of these physical properties permits
increased spectrum utilization.
Electromagnetic spectrum is a "limited" or "scarce" natural resource
possessing instantly renewable, nondepletable, degradable, and finite
37. In re Implementation of Section 309Q) of the Communications Act Competitive
Bidding, Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 2941 (1994).
38. 47 U.S.C.A. § 3090)(12) (West 1995).
39. Id. § 3090)(9).
40. Id. § 309Q)(11).
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physical properties.4 Spectrum is finite due to physical and technical
limits. Only a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum is commercially
viable.42 Usable radio frequencies range from 9 kilohertz (kHz) to 40
GHz43 but vary in their relative utility. As the frequency increases,
information capacity increases and receiving distance decreases. Carrying
distance is influenced by a frequency's ability to reflect, thereby extending
the distance of the signal. Information is transmitted by "modulating" wave
frequency.44 Different uses require different modulation capacity and, in
turn, different bandwidths.45 Therefore, usable spectrum is constrained by
the purposes for which it is used. Spectrum is nondepletable because the
supply of radio waves is infinite. However, spectrum is degradable because
overcrowding or interference may render spectrum unusable.'M
Electromagfetic spectrum can be organized according to its essential
physical dimensions of space, time, and frequency. First, a frequency may
be reused in different geographic regions provided two transmissions do not
interfere with each other.47 Second, frequencies are not a depletable
resource; instead, they are instantly renewed after use. Third, multiple
frequencies may be used in the same area at the same time. However, use
of one frequency constrains concurrent spectrum use in the same area. As
power increases, the physical space a signal occupies increases, thereby
interfering with the space of other signals.'
The utilitg of electromagnetic spectrum as a finite natural resource can
be increased through effective management of distance, time, and power.
41. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 11, at 247. See also Herter, supra note 14, at 651.
42. Electromagnetic spectrum is a series of waves traveling outward from an electrical
stimulus through space in a continuous sequence of peaks and troughs. Frequency is the
number of wavecrests per second (defined in hertz). Wavelength is the distance between
contiguous wavecrests (defined in meters). A wave's frequency multiplied by its wavelength
will equal the speed of light. Herter, supra note 14, at 652.
43. This is the developed region of radio frequency spectrum. All spectrum below 20
GHz is allocated and used. NTIA PRELIMINARY REALLOCATION, supra note 12, at 1-1.
Commercially viable spectrum is between 200 MHz and 5 GHz, and commercially attractive
spectrum is between 200 MHz and 3 GHz. The entire range of spectrum allocated in the
United States is between 9 kHz and 300 GHz. NTIA TELECOM 2000, supra note 9, at 663.
44. For example, bandwidth is constituted by the "carrier" wave and corresponding
"sideband" waves.
45. Television requires three hundred times the bandwidth of very low frequency (VLF)
point-to-point communications. Herter, supra note 14, at 653.
46. Id. at 655.
47. As previously noted, different frequencies enjoy different propagation characteris-
tics. Very high frequency waves (VHF) are able to penetrate the atmosphere but are limited
by atmospheric particles and rain. Short waves do not penetrate the ionosphere but are
carried great distances around the curvature of the earth by the reflection off the ionosphere.
Id. at 653.
48. Id. at 655.
[Vol. 48
SPECTRUM AUCTIONS
Competitive bidding effectively utilizes the physical properties of
electromagnetic spectrum to achieve maximum utilization and utility of a
finite resource.
B. A Scarce Resource?
The federal government's past policies toward allocation and
assignment assumed spectrum scarcity. Critics argue that the federal
government created false scarcity through its spectrum licensing policies.49
The federal government has taken both positions: that spectrum scarcity
exists and that it does not exist.'
The federal government's current domestic policy position is that a
sufficient supply of spectrum exists and spectrum can be reallocated to new
and expanding uses to ensure its full, efficient use. The distribution of
available spectrum between federal use, nonfederal use, and shared use
supports this position.5 In 1993, a House Committee found that the
federal government reserved 40 percent of the electromagnetic spectrum for
its use; a portion of this was shared with nonfederal users while retaining
primary access.' In 1988, the NTIA, as manager of the federal govern-
ment's use of radio frequency spectrum, concluded that the scarcity of
broadcast frequencies no longer existed and "that substantial improvements
in spectrum allocation and management can and should be achieved."'
Past action of the NTIA has supported this theory. A consumer need, made
possible by a recent technological development, was satisfied by realloca-
tion of unused or underutilized spectrum. Cellular telephone service, a
multibillion dollar industry that has created over 100,000 jobs, was
developed out of a reassignment of 50 MHz of spectrum from federal
49. Nicholas W. Allard, The New Spectrum Auction Law, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
13, 20 (1993).
50. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969) (spectrum scarcity);
NTIA TELECOM 2000, supra note 9, at 655-56 (1988) (no scarcity). See infra note 59.
51. In 1988, the NTIA reported that federal, nonfederal, and shared use represented,
respectively, 14%, 31.5%, and 62.5% of available spectrum. NTIA TELECOM2000, supra
note 9, at 663. In 1995, the NTIA reported that spectrum in the 0-3 GHz range was
allocated 14% to exclusive government use, 30% to exclusive nongovernment use, and 56%
shared by both the federal government and the private sector. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
FEDERAL SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT: How THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT USES & MANAGES
THE SPECTRUM 8 (1995). The measurements do not provide for different carrying capacities
of different frequencies. See supra notes 43 and 47.
52. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 11, at 263 (citing House Comm. on Energy and
Com.).
53. NTIA TELECOM 2000, supra note. 9, at 9, 18.
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government use to commercial use.'
However, a congressional committee found that spectrum scarcity was
the product of technological development as technological advances
significantly increased demand for electromagnetic spectrum. Originally,
spectrum assignments reflected interference concerns rather than efficient
use. Increases in private and nonfederal spectrum uses required spectrum-
efficient technologies. In addition, many of the frequencies reserved for
federal use were underutilized, inefficiently used, or even unused.'
Consequently, public interest demands more efficient government and
commercial use including implementing wire-based alternatives and
reassigning federal spectrum for commercial use.56
These findings support the belief that federal regulation of electromag-
netic spectrum has resulted in false scarcity. Proponents of the position
advocate that technology consistently expands the spectrum supply by
increasing utilization (e.g., the efficiency) and quantity (e.g., the range) of
usable spectrum.' This perspective is consistent with the NTIA's position
at the International Telecomurnunications Union (ITU) conference in 198258
as discussed in Appendix C: A Market Approach to International Allocation.
While the NTIA believed that spectrum was sufficient to fulfill efficient,
valuable needs, the critics believed that the federal government failed to
effectively promote domestic spectrum allocation and assignment. False
scarcity, which should not have developed given the inherent growth
potential of technology, resulted.
The scarcity issue need not be determined to effectively allocate
spectrum. As explained in Appendix D: Market Mechanisms and Spectrum
Scarcity, a market mechanism for spectrum allocation and assignment
maximizes social and economic utility under all three conditions. However,
scarcity, no scarcity, and false scarcity theories help explain past federal
spectrum policies. It is even possible that all three existed at different
times.59 But, what market or competitive mechanism is best suited to the
54. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 11, at 264-65; The National Information
Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,025, 49,036 (National Telecommunica-
tions and Information Administration 1993).
55. It is likely that a proportion of the existing spectrum uses and capabilities are mis-
matched. Different frequency bands have different physical characteristics. Different uses
have different operating requirements. Rapid development of new uses and new technology
makes it likely that the current portfolio of spectrum dependent service is not allocated and
assigned for maximum utility of usable electromagnetic spectrum. See supra note 47.
56. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 11, at 263-64.
57. Allard, supra note 49, at 20.
58. See supra note 14.
59. In contrast to arguments presented in RedLion, spectrum may have progressed from
no scarcity, at the time of the Communication Act, to scarcity, at the time of Red Lion and
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development of new or expanded spectrum use?
1I. ALLOCATION AND ASSIGNMENT ALTERNATIVES
A. Prior Methods and Goals
As discussed earlier, the NTIA and the FCC share responsibility for
domestic spectrum management. Under the Communications Act, the NTIA
manages federal government use,' and the FCC manages nonfederal use
by commercial, state, and local government entities.61 The NTIA and the
FCC mutually coordinate frequency allocations. The entire range of
allocated spectrum, 9 kHz-300 GHz, is contained in the National Table of
Frequency Allocations. As a member nation of the ITU, the Radio
Regulations62 and Final Acts63 of ITU conferences hold treaty status and
serve as the basis of domestic frequency allocations, assignments, and
regulations.'
The FCC allocates, assigns, and regulates electromagnetic spectrum
as required under the Communications Act to uphold "public interest,
convenience and necessity."' FCC policy decisions as to frequency band
use are governed by the Administrative Procedures Act.' Operating
bureaus of the FCC allocate spectrum in "blocks" according to service
classes under their jurisdictions. Under Sections 309(e), (i), and 0), where
there are mutually exclusive applicants for a new license to use electromag-
netic spectrum, the FCC awards licenses through either comparative
hearings,6' lotteries,' or competitive bidding.69 In select service class-
reassignment of federal spectrum for cellular services, and finally to false scarcity with the
introduction of lotteries. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Scarcity
would have developed because spectrum demand from technological and societal changes
increased faster than spectrum supply from technological advances in spectrum efficiency
and range. False scarcity would have developed because increasing supply from
technological advances would have fulfilled increasing demand but for a constraining factor
upon supply from lotteries, resulting in undeveloped licenses due to warehousing and
undercapitalization.
60. See supra note 9.
61. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(c), 305(a) (1988).
62. Radio Regulations, WORLD RADIOCOMMUNICATIONSCoNFERENCE (Nov. 18,1995).
63. Final Acts, WORLD RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE (Nov. 18, 1995).
64. NTIA TELECOM 2000, supra note 9, at 656-57, 663.
65. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 303, 309(j)(4)(C), (j)(7)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1995).
66. NTIA TELECOM 2000, supra note 9, at 657. 5 U.S.C.S. § 583 (1995).
67. Currently used to assign broadcast channels.
68. Previously used to assign cellular, paging, low-power television, interactive video
and data services, and wireless voice and data transmission services. Jennifer Pia Brovey,
Comment, Personal Communications Services: Crossing the Line From Regulation to
Implementation, 2 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 67, 76 (1994).
69. Currently used for PCS, DBS, MDS, SMR, and IVDS.
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es, such as land mobile services, the FCC accords private coordinating
groups official status to recommend frequency selections to the FCC.'
B. Assignment Mechanisms and Goals
At one time or another, the FCC has used five different assignment
methods: first-come/first-served, comparative hearings, user fees, random
selection, and competitive bidding. Each method offers unique benefits and
distinct constraints upon public interest, convenience, and necessity.
Congress mandated in Section 3090) four goals for subscriber
services: (1) development and rapid deployment of new products, services,
and technologies, (2) diversity in licensees, (3) financial return to the
public, and (4) efficient and intensive spectrum use.71 Consequently, the
FCC established four values for PCS spectrum allocation and regulation:
deployment speed, service competition, universality, and diversity.' What
is the capability of each market mechanism to fulfill these goals and values?
1. First-Come/First-Served
First-come/first-served is the default assignment method. If the FCC
does not receive "mutually exclusive applications" then it awards a license
to the first qualified applicant. Processing costs are low. Legal challenges
are limited to contesting whether the applicant is qualified. Limited legal
challenges and limited administrative work make processing very quick.
However, service competition, speed, universality, and diversity are likely
to be low. Successful licensees are effective applicants, quick to locate and
apply for available frequencies, rather than well-capitalized, capable service
providers. Low levels of invested capital promote service delay by creating
relatively more attractive speculative rather than service opportunities. 73
Subsequently, fewer services will be developed; spectrum use is likely to
be less efficient and intensively used; and public financial benefit will be
minimal with no revenue but very low administrative costs. However, with
low capital requirements, licensee diversity should improve. Control
functions, including licensee criteria, antitrafficking restrictions, minimum
70. NTIA TELECOM 2000, supra note 9, at 657-58, 663; 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(e), (i),
0)(1)-(2) (1988 & West Supp. 1995).
71. 47 U.S.C.A. § 3090)(3) (West Supp. 1995). In a subscription service, the end user
(customer) pays for the service of spectrum access and use.
72. Andrew C. Barrett & Byron F. Marchant, Emerging Technologies and Personal
Communications Services: Regulatory Issues, 1 COMMLAW CONSPECTus 3, 9 (1993).
73. Low investment in the license would create a situation similar to land speculation.
The risk/return relationship of starting service is relatively unattractive compared to that of
possessing spectrum because of the high capital requirements of launching service.
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capital requirements, and service deadlines, should mitigate or at least
minimize some of these undesired conditions. In sum, first-come/first-
served neither provides an efficient or effective use of spectrum nor insures
public interest, convenience, and necessity.
2. Comparative Hearings
Comparative hearings provide a marginal advantage over first-
come/first-served. Authorized under Section 309(b) of the Communications
Act, administrative hearings are conducted before administrative law
judges.74 Administrative cost and time increase significantly as qualifica-
tions must be checked and critically compared. While direct revenue
increases slightly with administrative application fees, net revenue does not
improve and may decline due to administrative costs. Licensing time
increases with additional administrative steps and legal challenges.
Comparative hearings that examine qualifications, prior operations, and
ownership character likely result in awarding licenses to parties with
service ability and experience as well as diversity in ownership and
management. Licensees' up-front invested capital requirements increase due
to additional costs of preparing, presenting, and defending qualifications for
comparative hearings as well as incurring opportunity costs for lost
competitions. This provides additional, but limited, incentive to develop the
frequency. Additional economic activity increases the taxable income base,
producing a gain in indirect revenue to the public from additional tax
revenue. In sum, comparative hearings are an inefficient distribution
method as they do not achieve optimal use or public interest.
3. User Fees
User fees offer significant advantages over comparative hearings.
Under the Independent Offices Appropriations Act of 1952 (IOAA)75 and
the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA),76 the
FCC, as an administrative agency, possesses legal authority to assess user
fees.7
74. Brovey, supra note 68, at 67; 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(b) (1995).
75. Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 1051 (1982) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§ 9701 (1994)).
76. Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272 § 5002, 100
Stat. 82 (1986) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 158 (1994)).
77. Under COBRA, user fees may be assessed without regard to actual use. Terrence
J. Schroepfer, Fee-Based Incentives and the Efficient Use of Spectrum, 44 FED. COMM. L.J.
411, 419 (1992) (citing Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989) and
Florida Power & Light Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1045 (1989)).
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User fees are difficult to price. Without a developed private market
to establish the free market price of electromagnetic spectrum, the FCC
would have to calculate "shadow prices"-the prices users would be willing
to pay for a service not privately sold-for all frequencies to be as-
signed.7 8 The federal government is very good at pricing core commodity
products with consistent physical properties and large, established markets.
Electromagnetic spectrum, however, is an inconsistent and speculative
product with different frequency bands having significantly different
physical properties and value varying by use. Therefore, even if a private
market exists, spectrum does not lend itself to consistent, predictable
pricing. Assuming that the FCC developed shadow prices based on foreign
markets, pricing errors in the base market would resonate in the domestic
market: a high shadow price would result in overinvestment in technology,
and a low shadow price would result in underinvestment in technology. The
inefficiencies of establishing a market price would produce higher costs and
risks. Users would seek higher rates of return on capital.
Compared to comparative hearings, public revenues would increase.
Significantly greater capital requirements and stable fees would reduce
speculation by licensees thereby inducing faster building of systems.
Universality of service, particularly in rural areas with lower density and
lower incomes, would improve as licenses in these areas would cost
comparatively less than those in major metropolitan areas with higher
density and higher income, thereby reducing development costs. Spectrum
use and efficiency would be higher due to increased investment in
technology which would serve to offset the additional licensing costs. In
sum, user fees prove more desirable than first-come/first-served and
comparative hearings.
4. Random Selection
In 1981, Congress authorized the FCC to use random selection to
assign electromagnetic spectrum.79 Spectrum lotteries, as conducted by the
FCC, proved a significant step backward in developing spectrum use,
efficiency, and equity. The FCC failed to implement substantive screening
requirements.' Unchecked speculation produced "license mills" charging
small investors 10 to 100 times filing costs. 8' Returns on investment were
78. Id. at 420.
79. In re Spectrum Efficiency in the Private Land Mobile Radio Bands in Use Prior to
1968, Notice ofInquiry, 6 FCC Rcd. 4126, paras. 22-23, 49-53, 65-70 (1991); Schroepfer,
supra note 77, at 411.
80. H.R. RE1P. No. 111, supra note 11, at 248.
81. Allard, supra note 49, at 26.
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"virtually nonexistent" given the odds, often facially defective applications,
and the limited practical use of the winnings.' In 1991, the North
American Securities Administrators Association issued a bulletin citing
wireless lotteries as the largest investor fraud in the nation.'
Random selection, even with additional controls such as must-build,
holding, and antitrafficking requirements, and increased application fees,
remains unattractive. The assignment method reduces public income, defers
development, limits diversity and universality, and promotes inefficient use.
Random selection produces no direct public revenue while incurring high
aggregate government and applicant administrative expenses. It defers
development as unqualified, undercapitalized, and inexperienced parties,
spurred by low investment requirements, win frequencies that require
repackaging to become useful assets. Without a market, diversity declines.
Universality suffers as qualified licensees avoid unattractive rural
properties. Spectrum use and efficiency decline because many licenses will
be in the hands of speculators rather than operators, or additional licenses
are needed to construct a useful band of frequencies. In sum, random
selection is less attractive than first-come/first-served, comparative
hearings, or user fees.
5. Competitive Bidding
Under Section 3090) of the Communications Act, 4 the FCC initiated
in 1994 competitive bidding for six types of subscriber services: narrow-
band and broadband PCS, DBS, MDS, SMR, and IVDS.Y Competitive
bidding proves the market mechanism of choice. First, public revenue, in
the short- and long-term, is maximized as the fair market value of the
electromagnetic spectrum less auction administrative expenses goes to the
U.S. Treasury, and taxes rise due to increased economic activity. Second,
speed of development increases because high licensing costs induce
successful bidders to launch services as soon as possible to recover large
initial investment. Third, universality of service increases as low prices of
rural licenses reduce development costs and attract investors unable or
unwilling to make capital requirements necessary to develop major metro
licenses. Fourth, high levels of spectrum efficiency and use are achieved
82. Id.
83. Id. at 26-27 n.48 (citing Executive Update, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, July 28, 1993,
at 3.).
84. 47 U.S.C.A. § 3090) (1995).
85. In re Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act Competitive
Bidding, Notice of ProposedRule Making, 8 FCC Rcd. 7635, paras. 1-3 (1993) [hereinafter
Implementation of Section 309g) Notice].
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as high spectrum costs foster large investments in technology to expand
capacity. In sum, as illustrated in Table 1: Summary of Assignment
Methods, Values, and Goals, competitive bidding maximizes spectrum
investment and activity.'
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF
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IV. COMPETITIVE BIDDING SYSTEMS
A. Criteria and Goals
Section 3090)(3) requires the FCC to design and test "multiple
alternative [bidding] methodologies under appropriate circumstances. " 17
The FCC has stated its clear intention to do so' and seeks, within
congressional guidelines, to "award licenses to eligible parties that value
them the most. "89 But which bid systems will best fulfill this objective in
86. See Table 1 for a comparative summary of the five assignment methods.
87. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309() (1995).
88. Implementation of Section 309() Notice, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 19.
89. Id. para. 34.
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direct transactions between the FCC and highest value users?90
The FCC has articulated both criteria and goals. To fulfill the
substantial requirements of Section 309(), the FCC stated three criteria:
administrative simplicity, government experience, and low application
costs.9' Through Sections 309(j)(10), 309(j)(12), and 925, 92 Congress
placed the FCC on a tight timetable to propose, execute, and evaluate
spectrum auctions for new communications services. The FCC has stated
its desire to develop competitive bidding structures that are "simple and
easy to administer" as "unnecessary complexity in conception or execution
is likely to cause delay and frustrate Congress's intent to speed new
services to the public."' The FCC, as it had no experience in conducting
spectrum auctions, anticipated relying upon the experience of other
government agencies. 94 Reeling from the spectrum lottery fiascoes, the
FCC sought bidding systems and rules that minimized costs for both
applicants and the FCC.'
The FCC sought bid systems that would fulfill four goals mandated
under Section 3090)(3): revenue maximization, rapid development, efficient
and intensive use, and licensee diversity. Four traditional bid systems-oral
ascending, oral descending, sealed bid, and second-price sealed bid
systems9-and three nontraditional bid systems-Japanese auction,
sequential sealed, and SMRE-offer relative strengths and weaknesses in
fulfilling these criteria and goals. 7 The FCC and prospective bidders
evaluated these bid systems using game theory, an applied mathematical
study of decision making that predicts participants' actions and gains in
competitive situations such as designed markets and auctions.9 The
federal government has used game theory to design bidding structures for
offshore oil leases and treasury bill auctions. 99 Under game theory, each
90. The FCC recognizes that it may fail to sell the license to the highest value user. It
authorized a limited secondary market with low transactions costs to transfer the license to
the highest value user. Id.
91. Id. para. 18.
92. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 309(j)(10), 309(j)(12), 925 (West Supp. 1995).
93. Implementation of Section 309a) Notice, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 18.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. para. 36.
97. This list is not intended to be a comprehensive presentation of potential bid systems.
Bidding systems can be combined and refined to produce a much larger number of
applicable systems. Rather, this group represents a spectrum of four basic approaches and
three derived systems.
98. Peter Passell, Game Theory Captures a Nobel, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1994, at Dl;
Amanda Bennett, Nobel in Economics Is Awarded to Three For Pioneering Work in Game
Theory, WALL ST. ., Oct. 12, 1994, at B3.
99. Bennett, supra note 98, at B14.
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bidding system produces unique results in critical auction factors such as
winner's curse, escalation and default, collusion, and aggregation. Winner's
curse results when, assuming similar uses, the party that most overesti-
mates the value wins."° Escalation and default results from winner's
curse or strategic opportunism as the winner defaults to a significantly
lower bid."' Aggregation is the combining of licenses across bandwidth
or geographic area. These factors determine the appropriateness of a
bidding method for a particular use.
B. Traditional Bidding Systems
Under an ascending price or "English" auction, bidding is open and
escalates until one party remains. The open character of the auction
produces high prices and risks. High prices result as bidders are reassured
by the continued interest of others. Risks result from the increased
likelihood of collusion, winner's curse and escalation and default. While
explicit or tacit collusion can be avoided through close, real-time monitor-
ing, profit uncertainty, leading to winner's curse, and strategic opportunism
foster escalation and default. Aggregation proves difficult. Increased costs
and delays result as traders and holdouts reap profits from after-market
transactions."' 2
In July 1994, the federal government conducted an "oral outcry"
auction of 594 IVDS licenses, raising $200 million. While total sales
exceeded pre-auction estimates tenfold, several winners, including the
auction's highest bidder at $4.3 million for Miami, experienced winner's
curse and defaulted on their bids. The FCC plans to re-auction these
licenses and impose fines or penalties upon the defaulting parties."3
Under a descending price or "Dutch" auction, bidding is open, starts
high, and descends until one party bids. Compared to English auctions,
Dutch auctions produce lower bids while retaining similar risks."'' 4
Lacking rival bids that communicate independent valuations of the
resource, bidders bid low to avoid winner's curse.05 The open character
provides close monitoring against collusion agreements.106
100. Revenge of the Nerds, ECONOMIST, July 23, 1994, at 70, 70.
101. Allard, supra note 49, at 53.
102. Implementation of Section 309() Notice, 9 FCC Rcd. 7635, para. 35 (1993).
103. Robert Aamoth, Uncle Sam Hits the Jackpot, COMM. INT'L, Sept. 1994, at 5, 5.
104. Implementation of Section 309(g) Notice, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 42.
105. Mark Lewyn, A Feast for Small Fry-Or Desert for the Big Guys?, Bus.WK., Oct.
10, 1994, at 116, 116.
106. Collusion would constitute an illegal antitrust agreement under either the Sherman
Act or § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Sherman Antitrust Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
86, 101 Stat. 655 (1987) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 41); Federal Trade
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Under a sealed bid auction, bidding is secret and escalates until one
party remains. Anonymous bids inhibit full price expression by parties.
Like the Dutch auction, parties in sealed bid auctions bid lower than they
are willing to pay. Seeking to avoid paying more than necessary, the party
willing to bid the most fails to do so."° However, sealed bid auctions are
less susceptible to collusion because colluders cannot protect against the
awarding of licenses to noncolluders or breaching colluders.10 8 Winner's
curse and escalation and default risks are significantly less in both open bid
methods, as bidders lack competitive information or default mechanisms.
Under a "second-price sealed bid" or "Vickrey" auction, bidding is
secret and escalates until one party is left, but the winning party only pays
the price of the second-highest bid. Vickrey auctions produce high bids,
lower risks, and lower revenue. While second-price sealed bid auctions
award the resource to the party that values it the most, they only yield the
second highest value. The difference between expressed values may
increase as the second highest party withholds its true estimate of the value,
fearing that such information may be used to its detriment in a subsequent
auction.'" Like sealed bid auctions, Vickrey auctions are resistant to
collusion as well as escalation and default." 0
C. Nontraditional Bidding Systems
Under a "Japanese" auction, bidding escalates in specified increments.
Parties must bid at each increment or permanently drop out. A Japanese
auction produces higher prices and lower risks than English auctions. The
open format fosters maximum, real-price expression, producing higher bids
and increasing probability that the highest value user will win the resource.
Winner's curse is less likely as bidders know the number and identity of
bidders. In addition, preset intervals eliminate blocking strategies and
irrational bids that result in escalation and default situations."' However,
a Japanese auction does not provide for aggregation.
Under a sequential-sealed bid auction, sealed "combinatorial" bids are
taken for license groups and ascending oral bids are taken for individual
licenses. Sealed bids are submitted prior to bidding and opened after oral
Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246 (1982) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 6a). See Dennis A. Yao & Susan S. DeSanti, Game Theory and the Legal
Analysis of Tacit Collusion, 38 ANTrrRusT BULL. 113 (1993).
107. Implementation of Section 309y) Notice, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 41.
108. Id. para. 40.
109. Id. para. 45.
110. Id. para. 40.
111. Allard, supra note 49, at 54.
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bidding is completed. Oral bidding on individual licenses is conducted
sequentially. Winning combinatorial bids would be compared to winning
oral bids and would be awarded the license where the combinatorial bid
proved greater than the sum of the individual oral bids. The increased
profitability or service value of aggregation should be expressed in the
form of superior combinatorial bids. However, the sequence of the
resources auctioned will affect the outcome. Potentially higher value
combinatorial bidders will not receive the benefits of simultaneous bidding
as oral bidders do. Due to its structure, sequential bidding, especially
sealed bids, requires time, a limited resource given the timetable mandated
by Congress. 112
Under SMRE bidding, both combinatorial and individual bids are
made simultaneously in a series of predefined bidding rounds." 3 SMRE
bidding fosters aggregation and maximizes use of bidding information. All
bids remain open and can be increased or decreased until the last round
closes. Due to its relative benefits as illustrated in Table 2: Summary of Bid
Systems, Benefits, and Game Theory Factors, SMRE has become the
preferred method of the FCC and, therefore, has been used to conduct all
auctions except for the first auction for IVDS.
TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF
BID SYSTEMS, BENEFITS AND GAME THEORY FACTORS
Traditional Bid Systems Nontraditional Systems
Oral Oral Sealed Second Japan Seqntl SMRE
Ascend Descen Bid Price iJAuction Sealed Bidding
BENEFITS
Revenue + . . . . .++ +++ ++++
Aggregation no no no no no yes yes
FACTORS (Likelihood)
Winner's Curse high high low low low low low
Escalation/Default high high low low no low low
Collusion high high medium low low no low
In July 1994, the FCC conducted a nationwide narrowband PCS
auction using SMRE bidding."4 Using electronic terminals, preregistered
112. Implementation of Section 309() Notice, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 51.
113. Id. para. 56.
114. The FCC auctioned 2 MHz of spectrum in the 900 MHz band. The FCC had
reserved 3 MHz for narrowband PCS. William J. Franklin, New WirelessRegulations-How
Will They Affect You?, CELLULAR Bus., May 1994, at 62, 66.
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parties anonymously bid in forty-seven rounds over five days upon ten
nationwide licenses for advanced paging and messaging services.115 Six
parties successfully bid $617 million (net) for the licenses, ten times the
pre-auction estimate.116 Since then, the FCC has completed SMRE
auctions for thirty narrowband licenses lasting 105 rounds, raising $395
million; 99 A/B block broadband licenses lasting 112 rounds, generating
$7.034 billion; two DBS licenses lasting 19 and 25 rounds, receiving $735
million; 493 MDS licenses lasting 181 rounds, yielding $216 million; 1020
SMR licenses lasting 168 rounds, producing $204 million; and 493 C block
broadband licenses lasting 183 rounds, generating $10.217 billion.'17
V. CURRENT AND RECOMMENDED AUCnoN STRUCTURES
A. FCC Preferred Auction Structure
Using SMRE bidding, the FCC will ultimately award, in six auctions,
licenses for 2071 broadband PCS licenses contained in 120 MHz of
spectrum, three units of 30 MHz and three of 10 MHz."' The FCC has
conducted two auctions for three blocks encompassing a total of 90 MHz
of the spectrum allocated for broadband PCS services. In March 1995, the
FCC concluded the first broadband auction of blocks A and B consisting
of 99 MTA 30 MHz licenses."' In December 1995, the FCC initiated an
115. Aamoth, supra note 103, at 5.
116. Announcing the High Bidders in the Auction of Ten Nationwide Narrowband PCD
Licenses; Winning Bids Total $617,006,674, Public Notice (Aug. 2, 1994) (nationwide
narrowband PCS).
117. See sources cited supra note 3.
118. The FCC allocated 120 MHz of spectrum in the 2 GHz band from 1850 to 1990
MHz for broadband PCS; 20 MHz are reserved for unlicensed spectrum. The FCC plans
to award 2074 licenses (2071 by auction and 3 as pioneer preferences) in six blocks (A-F).
Each block is either 30 MHz or 10 MHz in bandwidth and divided into either 493 BTAs
or 51 MTAs, two different Rand McNally systems (with a few changes) of defining the
geographic scope of individual licenses. BROADBAND PCS FACT SHEET (1994), at 1 (in
broadband A/B block PCS auction packet).
FCC Broadband PCS Auction Structure
Block A BlockB Block C Block D Block E Block F Total A-F
Bandwidth 30 MIHz 30 MHz 30 MHz 10 MHz 10 MHz 10 MHz 120 MHz
Geographic Scope 48 MTAs 51 MTAs 493 BTAs 493 BTAs 493 BTAs 493 BTAs 2071 Licenses
Entrepreneurs' Yes Yes 33% (40
Block MHZ)
119. Commercial Mobile Radio Service Information Announcing the Winning Bidders
in the FCC's Auction of 99 Licenses to Provide Broadband PCS in Major Trading Areas;
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auction of the entrepreneurs' C block, consisting of 493 BTA 30 MHz
licenses." After completing the 30 MHz blocks, the FCC will auction
1479 10 MHz BTA licenses in the remaining D, E, and entrepreneurs' F
blocks, either simultaneously or in series. Based largely upon a plan by
Motorola, the choice of auction method and rules illustrate the FCC's
reliance upon game theory and prior experience to fulfill the congressional
mandates of Section 3090).21
Under Section 309(j)(3)(C), the FCC sought to maximize revenue by
employing (1) ascending price SMRE bidding, (2) preregistration
disclosure, (3) up-front payments, and (4) transfer restrictions.'2 Ascend-
ing price bidding encourages high bids. SMRE bidding provides for
aggregation premiums. Together these two methods counterbalance the
bidders' propensity to overbid, collude, or escalate and default. Preregistra-
tion requirements include simultaneous disclosure of markets sought,
disclosure of ownership and control in bidding entities, and a ban upon
communication between bidding entities." Disclosure enhances bidding
accuracy, maximizes revenue, and reduces risk because parties estimate
license values to competing parties given their composition and apparent
aggregation strategies. The communication ban protects against collusion.
Up-front payments (deposits) on each license sought determine aggregate
size of licenses bid upon as well as discourage unplanned and strategic
defaults like those that occurred in the July 1994 IVDS auction. The
payments, based on the population of licenses sought, have reached $16
Down Payments Due March 20, 1995, Public Notice (Mar. 13, 1995) (A/B block broadband
PCS).
120. FCC C-Block Auction: Final Results, supra note 4.
121. Christopher Stem, FCC's New Deal for PCS, BRDCST & CABLE, June 13, 1994,
at 10, 10. Ninety-nine licenses for auction reflect three licenses retained for pioneer
preferences. (2 licenses/MTA x 51 MTAs) - 3 pioneer licenses = 99 available licenses. Id.
Alan Pearce, Competitive Bidding or Cooperation?, AM. NETWORK, July 15, 1994, at 62,
62; Edmund L. Andrews, More Than 70 Concerns Seek Wireless Licenses, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 2, 1994, at D2.
122. Section 3090)(3)(D) requires the FCC to use methods in awarding licenses that
recover "for the public a portion of the value of the public spectrum resource made
available for commercial use," and avoid "unjust enrichment." Read together, these sections
mandate revenue maximization. Absent other interests, awarding a license for less than the
maximum value would unduly enrich the licensee.
123. The broadband PCS deadline was November 2, 1994, five weeks before the
December 5, 1994 auction date.
124. Within five days after an auction, successful parties must increase their payments
to 20% of their total bids. George Gilder's Telecosm, FORBES PLus, Apr. 11, 1994, at 99.
Defaults reduce auction revenue by delaying development. Such a delay puts the licensee
at a competitive disadvantage. The licensee either has less time before utilizing the band,
or the spectrum dependent product or service comes to market later. Both will reduce the
value of the license. See also BROADBAND PCS FACT SHEET, supra note 118, at 4.
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million for an individual license or $150 million for national coverage."z
Five-year transfer restrictions upon designated entities ensure such benefits
go to parties that build rather than trade systems." These rules maximize
revenues and protect against unjust enrichment.
Under Section 309(j)(3)(A), the FCC sought rapid development and
deployment of new services, products, and technologies by employing (1)
auctions, (2) build-out requirements, and (3) transferability. Successful
auctions award the resource to the highest valued use at the highest market
price. The high use value and up-front cost of spectrum acquisition
promote rapid development of the service and value-adding technology."z
Speculation that results in warehousing remains unattractive. 11 Build-out
requirements for designated entities ensure product and service develop-
ment. Transferability of licenses ensures an active secondary market in new
services offering more efficient and intensive use.
Under Section 309(j)(3)(D), the FCC sought efficient and intensive
use by providing for aggregation and bidding groups. Aggregation enables
lower costs or higher valued services which result in increased spectrum
use. The premium that aggregation places on spectrum use forces increased
efficiency and intensity of competing nonaggregated spectrum use."
Bidding groups, by expanding the universe of spectrum users (licensees),
increase the potential and pressure to integrate uses. In addition, reduced
capital outlay for each partner leaves more capital for technological
development to expand spectrum efficiency and utility.
Under Section 309(j)(3)(B), the FCC sought licensee diversity by
establishing (1) multiple partitioning and bandwidth schemes, (2) entrepre-
neurs' blocks, (3) designated entity rules, and (4) licensee bandwidth
limitations. Selling spectrum on several different scales-nationwide,
125. The up-front payment is either $0.015 (F block) or $0.02 (A, B, D, and E blocks)
per MHz per population in license area (MHz-pop). See sources cited supra note 3, at 3;
Deborah Eby, FCC Shakes the Money. Tree for PCS Entrepreneurs, AM. NETWoRK, Aug.
1, 1994, at 19. In the December 1994 auction of A and B blocks (30 MHz each awarded
on MTA basis), the three largest up-front payments (calculated as population x block size
in MHz x $0.02) were New York at $15.8 million (26.4 million pops x 30 MHz x $0.02),
Los Angeles-San Diego at $11.5 million, and Chicago at $7.2 million. Andrews, supra note
121, at D2; FCC SUMMARY OF LICENSES TO BE AUCTIONED: BLOCKS A AND B (1994) (in
broadband PCS auction packet).
126. Under § 309(j)(4)(E), Congress specifically required the FCC to employ disclosure,
up-front payments, and transfer restrictions to "prevent unjust enrichment."
127. License payments will represent as much as one-third of total development cost. For
example, a Chicago broadband PCS license may sell for $100 million and require an
additional $200 million to build the system. Lewyn, supra note 105, at 116.
128. Speculation, the planned transfer *of the resource to another party, should be
unattractive as any higher valued use should have won the bid.
129. Nonaggregated uses that cannot meet aggregated use bids for spectrum fall out.
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regional, MTA, BTA, MSA/RSA, and custom licensee parti-
tion' 30-permits investment opportunities of various scale within the same
area. Different spectrum block sizes of 10 and 30 MHz permit different
investment opportunities for various product or service types. Such
diversity in investment scale and scope attracts a diverse group of licensees.
Establishing entrepreneurs' blocks guarantees small business participation
in PCS. Only firms with gross revenues of less than $125 million in each
of the previous three years and total assets of less than $500 million may
bid upon the two entrepreneurs' blocks, and firms with gross revenues of
less than $40 million in each of the previous three years are entitled to a
25 percent discount.131 Finally, each licensee is limited to 40 MHz per
market.Y3 2 A PCS licensee who is "cellular career," holding a 20 percent
interest in a cellular service encompassing 10 percent of the census
population of the proposed PCS service area, is limited to 10 MHz. An
interest of less than 5 percent will not count toward the 40 MHz limit,
thereby permitting telephone companies to participate in several PCS
licenses. 33 These spectrum limitations will protect against excessive
concentration. 134
The SMRE auctions are designed to fulfill the FCC's congressional
mandate to establish competitive bidding systems that (1) raise revenue
while avoiding unjust enrichment, (2) promote rapid development and
deployment of new products, services, and technology, (3) guarantee
efficient and intensive spectrum use, and (4) ensure licensee diversity
through the significant participation of small businesses. There is a
significant flaw in the auction system.
B. Recommendation
The FCC's block allocation and SMRE auction system will ultimately
fail to remain an optimal allocation and assignment process. The prospec-
tive theoretical superiority and operational success of SMRE auctions is
based upon a real estate concept of spectrum.135 The FCC has created a
competitive allocation and assignment system that optimizes the constructed
130. PCS licensees may sell to a local exchange carrier overlapping spectrum. Eby,
supra note 125, at 19.
131. In re Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act Competitive
Bidding, Sixth Report and Order, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 934 (1995).
132. Stem, FCC's New Deal, supra note 121, at 19.
133. John Prendergast, PCS Spectrum is Going Once, Going Twice, AM. NETwoRK,
Feb. 15, 1994, at 50.
134. Lacking any set aside, the IVDS auction awarded minority-owned businesses 33%
and women-owned businesses 38% of the licenses. Eby, supra note 125, at 19.
135. George Gilder's Telecosm, supra note 124, at 99.
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property rights and assumed physical characteristics of an exclusive
spectrum band. The FCC and NTIA allocate spectrum blocks to uses based
on projected demand of products and services. An assigned licensee enjoys
the right to use, exclude, and assign spectrum. Efficient use is predicated
upon relative physical properties of frequency bands. The FCC's system of
block allocation and competitive assignment, while promoting development
of electromagnetic spectrum, fails to adequately provide for technological
innovation.
Two recent technological developments render exclusive frequency
licenses an inefficient means of spectrum management. First, bandwidth
need not be inversely proportional to dynamic range. The underlying
premise of spectrum band assignment is that accuracy and sensitivity
decline as bandwidth increases. However, Steinbrecher Corp. of Burling-
ton, Massachusetts has developed a broadcasting platform ("radio") that
treats frequencies uniformly and provides immediate access to all usable
bands. A Steinbrecher radio provides access upon demand to all frequencies
without accuracy and sensitivity constraints. 13 6
Second, users may simultaneously use the same frequency without
interfering with each other. The traditional spectrum assignment scheme
divides a frequency by time and geography, limiting a frequency band to
one user in a particular area at a particular time. However, Qualcomm of
San Diego, California developed a spread-spectrum modulation scheme that
permits concurrent frequency use. 37 The Qualcomm modulation scheme
permits numerous users to employ the same frequencies at the same time
while increasing effective usable capacity 140-fold. 3 1
These two technological developments challenge the theoretical
foundations of block allocation and competitive bidding assignment. To
date, the principle spectrum management policy has been to promote the
development and deployment of spectrum dependent products and services.
Technological development was seen as the means of increasing the supply
of products and services. Recent and impending technological developments
suggest an alternate policy model of promoting spectrum enhancing
(enlarging) technological development. Development and deployment of
spectrum products and services will follow.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. A spread-spectrum, code-division multiple access (CDMA) modulation scheme
offers 20-fold capacity over analog modulation. CDMA modulation also permits use of
entire cellular 11.5 MI-Iz bandwidth. Analog modulation schemes use only one in seven
cells to prevent interference. Therefore, 20 x 7 = 140. Id.
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Under such a policy re-orientation, a user fee system replaces auctions
as the preferred method of spectrum management. Revenue recovery would
be separated from licensing. There are significant barriers to establishing
a user fee system. First, prior judicial rulings limit the power of adminis-
trative agencies to implement fees beyond direct administrative costs.
Second, taxing an essential communication vehicle would raise significant
First Amendment rights issues. Third, shadow prices for unit user fees
would be difficult to establish without an established secondary market in
spectrum use.
By the time the licenses currently up for auction expire in ten years,
it is unlikely the basic spectrum rights and revenue assumptions will remain
valid. Either the rules and rights accompanying spectrum auctions will have
to change or the system of competitive bidding itself will require replace-
ment.
APPENDIX A:
SUMMARY RESULTS OF SPECTRUM AUCTIONS





PCS A/B Block MrABroadban
DBS 110 Degree Orbital
DBS 148 Degree Orbital
MDS BTA
SMR 900 MHz MTA
PCS C Block BTA Broadband
8 Subtotal SMRE Bidding
OTHER AUCTIONS
PCS Pioneer Preferecs*
IVDS MSA Oral Outcry Auction
2 Subtotal Other Auctions
TOTAL SPECTRUM AUCTION
10 Total
Licenses Auction Eligible Initial Winning Net
Available CloseDateH Bidders #Bids Rounds Entities Rev enue
for Round 1 S million
10 7/94 29 NA 47 6 617
30 11/94 28 122 105 9 395
nd 99 3/95 30 83 112 18 7,034
1 1196 3 3 19 1 683
1 1/96 2 2 25 1 52
493 3/96 50 98 181 67 216
1,020 4/96 105 201 168 80 204
493 5/96 255 2,102 183 88 10,217
2,147 2,611 840 19,418
4 295, 6/95 89 50 NA 4 735
594 7/94 _J 472 NA 112 177 214
598 50 112 949
2,745 2661 952 20.367
NOTE. * The FCC awarded 4 pioneer preferences: I nationwide narrowband license ($33 million) and
3 A-Block broadband licenses ($702 million) based on the corresponding SMRE auction results.
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APPENDIX B: OVERVIEW OF SPECTRUM
REALLOCATION REQUIREMENTS AND FINAL PLAN
Exclusive Below 3 (Hz- 25 NM
Immediate 2390-2400 & 2402-17 (8/94) E
50Total-100 MHZ (n)
Exclusive Above 3 GHz- 25 MHz [102 ME-z Fnal Plan]
4660-85 (2/94) Exclusive Below 3 GHz
Total Reallocation Below 3GHz -25MHz , [52 MHz Final Plan]200 NM (minimum) [27 M-1 FinalPan
from Federal to 1390-1400 & 1427-32 (1199)
Non-Federal Use Exclusive 2300-10 & 2400-02 (8/95)
[235 MHz Final Plan] 50 h
(minimum)- Above 3 Gfz- 25 MErz
Delayed 4635-60 (1/97)
Reallocation "
150 Mffz (rain) Below 3 GI-z - 50 M-Iz
[185 MEz Final Plan] [83 NM Final Plan] Below 3 GHz
1670-75 & 1710-55 (1M19) Total - 100 MHz (min)
NOTE. Mxed 2417-50 (8195) [135 MHz Final Plan]
Reallocated frequency bands in 100 M-z
MHz; availability dates in italics. (minimum) Above 3 GHz- 50 MHz
* Limited availability;, balance in 2004. 3650-3700 (1/99)
APPENDIX C: A MARKET APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL
ALLOCATION
As a natural resource, spectrum allocation is a critical international
property right issue. Developed nations have taken a market approach to
electromagnetic spectrum resource allocation. Electromagnetic spectrum is
treated as a "common property" resource rather than a "shared" natural
resource. A first-come/first-served approach has predominated in
international orbit-spectrum allocation. The initial user does not gain a
proprietary right in that frequency.'39 International regulatory require-
ments guarantee the applicant the right to use spectrum without harmful
interference. 14
However, with the rapid development of satellite technology,
spectrum allocation has become a significant area of contention, infused
with issues of equity and fairness, between developed countries and lesser
developed countries (LDCs). LDCs seek advanced planning of orbit-
spectrum resources that guarantee them orbit positions. Developed
139. Herter, supra note 14, at 661-62.
140. Successful registration with the International Frequency Registration Board of the
ITU of space allocated ensures space in the ITU's Table of Frequency Allocations.
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countries seek to provide spectrum where LDCs have a present and
practical need and can achieve optimal use of that spectrum, taking into
account technical advances between allocation and use.141 The developed
countries' emphasis on consumer demand, market efficiencies, and
technological improvements foreshadowed the federal government's use of
competitive bidding. In effect, developed countries opened up international
electromagnetic spectrum allocation to competitive bidding by LDCs. The
United States believed guaranteed access was inherently inequitable because
it deprived the international community of the opportunity to enjoy the
fullest, most efficient use of electromagnetic spectrum. 142 In 1982,
twenty-four years after the introduction of the first congressional bill to
authorize domestic communications license auctions,143 the Congress's
Office of Technology Assessment forecast that technological development
would likely "expand the effective utility of the available spectrum to
satisfy future needs of all nations."'"
The disagreement continues because the the LDCs and the developed
nations hold fundamentally different beliefs as to the scarcity of usable
electromagnetic spectrum. Developed countries maintain that electromagnet-
ic spectrum, although a finite natural resource, is sufficient in supply to
fulfill worldwide demand, provided it is used in an efficient, high utility,
technologically advanced manner. LDCs maintain that electromagnetic
spectrum is a scarce natural resource, inequitably distributed in a manner
favoring established use.
A market solution, such as competitive bidding by nations or users to
allocate spectrum on a worldwide scale, remains unlikely. The standard of
living and per capita gross domestic product in developed nations are
greater than that generally found in LDCs. 45 Generally, the value of
comparable use would be greater in a developed nation than in an LDC. A
141. Herter, supra note 14, at 661-62.
142. Id. at 662.
143. In 1958, a House bill provided for television station license auctions. In 1988,
President Reagan proposed spectrum auctions as part of the fiscal year 1989 budget. In 1989
and 1991, John Dingell (D-Mich.) introduced two auction bills. The first, the Emerging
Telecommunications Technology Act, was passed by the House, but failed to pass the
Senate. H.R.2965, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989). Rep. Dingell reintroduced the bill as the
Emerging Telecommunications Technologies Act of 1991, which was later enacted. H.R.
531, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (enacted). See Allard, supra note 12, at 15, 30.
144. Herter, supra note 14, at 662-63 (quoting OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, RADIOFRE-
QUENCY USE AND MANAGEMENT: IMPACTS FROM THE WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO
CONFERENCE OF 1979 (1982)).
145. In 1992, per capita gross domestic product was $23,400 in the United States and
$17,400 in Germany versus $300 in Nigeria. WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 769,
755, 806, 833 (1995).
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competitive bid for LDC use would succeed only where LDC demand, the
absolute marginal value of a particular service, was significantly greater
than a developed nation's demand. Technological development accentuates
the imbalance. First, technology requires developed capital markets and
skills. Second, technology seeks out the highest "value-added" use, a
function of relative cost benefit (percentage improvement) and market size
(dollar volume). Other factors being equivalent, a technological develop-
ment only migrates to LDCs where the potential per capita utility benefit
(cost benefit) proves substantially greater than in developed nations.
APPENDIX D: MARKET MECHANISMS AND SPECTRUM SCARCITY
If spectrum is scarce, then a market mechanism will award spectrum
to those uses in order of their utility value until spectrum is "used up." As
the value of the uses increases, so do incentives to invest in technology that
will increase the number and capabilities of uses. Technological advances
continue until the cost of expanded use through increased efficiency and
expanded range reach the value assigned to the lowest valued use. Under
a theory of scarcity, at some point, the cost of technological development
no longer "pays," potential spectrum uses are not realized as they cannot
afford a license, and the cost of technological development does not justify
expanding spectrum capacity. Therefore, a market mechanism insures the
greatest level of social utility by allocating and assigning frequencies to the
most valued uses while funding a secondary market in technological
development.
If spectrum is not scarce, a market mechanism again will award
spectrum to users according to their relative utility value. Uses will
compete for positions on the spectrum according to their particular
operating requirements and the desired physical characteristics. Frequency
band physical characteristics vary as to propagation properties, information
capacity, and interference. Uses operating requirements vary as to
transmission point, reception point, and bandwidth. For each use, there is
a frequency band that provides optimal results and bands which prove
incapable of providing the desired result.1" If there is no scarcity, uses
146. For example, satellite communications and space tracking use VHF waves (30-300
MHz) that penetrate the earth's atmosphere rather than low frequency (LF) waves (30-300
kHz) that travel great distances close to the ground or short waves, which are a portion of
the high frequency (HF) band (3-30 MHz) that travel extended distances by repeatedly
bouncing between the ionosphere and the earth. However, the military is a significant user
of the LF band even though LF bands carry little information and overseas broadcast
services (e.g. Voice of America) prize HF band assignments despite the congestion" of HF
bands. In turn, the military would value HF bands but only for satellite operations (e.g.
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will compete for spectrum positions based on the value of the frequency
bands' characteristics. A particular use will not only compete for a
particular band against other similar uses but also against different uses that
value that particular band for the same or different characteristics. The
competition for a particular band will operate much like spectrum scarcity.
Although there is spectrum for all uses, uses compete for scarce frequen-
cies with particular characteristics. As the value of the frequency band
increases so does the incentive to invest in technology that will either
decrease the amount of spectrum required for that use or make accessible
that desired characteristic in another band. Under a theory of no scarcity,
at some point, further technological development does not "pay," the
supply of desired characteristics is no longer expanded, and unassigned
uses seek a position on another frequency band with less desirable
characteristics. Therefore, in a situation of no scarcity, a market mecha-
nism insures the greatest level of social utility by allocating and assigning
uses to particular frequency bands according to the bands' relative benefits,
while funding a secondary market in technological development.
If false scarcity conditions exist, a market mechanism will operate as
if true scarcity exists. A market mechanism will award spectrum to those
uses in the order of their utility until spectrum is "used up." If a market
mechanism effectively ends scarcity, then the market mechanism will
operate as it would in a situation of no scarcity. A market mechanism will
place uses into different frequency bands according to the value of the
bands' characteristics to each particular use. However, false scarcity will
operate differently than either scarcity or no scarcity in three ways.
First, there will be significant, sudden shifts in the supply of usable
spectrum as regulatory mechanisms causing false scarcity are initiated,
terminated, or revised. For example, Section 309(i) authorizes random
selection to award a license or construction permit involving the use of
electromagnetic spectrum.147 In the 1980s and 1990s, the FCC operated
spectrum lotteries without adequate financial, technical, or antitrafficking
controls. A volatile speculative market developed, and in many instances,
the FCC awarded licenses to "licensing mills" and other parties ill-
equipped to build or operate a service that effectively utilized radio
spectrum."4 Universally extending, ending, or rewriting lotteries would
produce sudden, significant shifts in the demand for and supply of
surveillance, navigation, satellite communications) and overseas broadcasting services would
value HF bands but only for satellite operations (e.g., Star in Asia, BsB Sky in Europe).
Herter, supra note 14, at 653.
147. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(i) (West Supp. 1995).
148. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 11, at 248.
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electromagnetic spectrum. 49 Ultimately, a developed secondary market
in license application would soften these shifts, but it would take time to
develop.
Second, false scarcity will deter investment in technology to increase
the spectrum capacity. Spectrum-based businesses would shift resources
from technological development to lobbying and speculation. Businesses
would invest in lobbying activities to change regulations responsible for
creating false spectrum. Businesses would also invest in upstream
speculative activities as a means of offsetting such costs. Subsequently, the
amount of spectrum capacity will be less than that which would have
existed under equivalent conditions of scarcity or no scarcity.
Third, false scarcity will increase switching costs. Currently, spectrum
license holders enjoy a qualified right of renewal. 5 The spectrum
auction law specifically maintains that right.' Switching frequencies is
the exception rather than the rule. Equipment is purchased and operations
maintained with the expectation of operating on the same frequency by
changing frequencies unexpectedly, the licensee will likely incur equip-
ment, facilities, marketing, and customer service costs greater than if the
licensee had expected the prospect of switching. These costs are not viewed
as a normal cost of doing business, rather they are extraordinary in
character.' False scarcity involves significant, sudden shifts in the
supply of usable spectrum as regulatory mechanisms causing false scarcity
are initiated, terminated or revised. Short-term incentives are more volatile
149. Such changes would induce shifts in the supply and demand curves for spectrum and
therefore change the value of a spectrum license.
150. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 69 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 1995); Central Florida
Enterprises v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1084 (1983);
In re Amendment of Parts 21 and 74 of the Comm'n's Rules with Regard to Filing
Procedures in the Multipoint Distribution Service and in the Instructional Television Fixed
Service and Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act, Memorandum
Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 10 FCC Rcd. 13821 (1995).
151. "Nothing in this subsection, or in the use of competitive bidding, shall ... [b]e
construed to convey any rights, including any expectation of renewal of a license, that differ
from the rights that apply to other licenses within the same service that were not issued
pursuant to this subsection." 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(6) (Supp. 1995).
152. Support for the additional expense and extraordinary character of changed frequency
costs can be found in the NTIAO Act. Under § 926, the president is given the authority to
reclaim reassigned frequencies. "The Federal Government shall bear all costs of reclaiming
frequencies pursuant to this section, including the cost of equipment which is rendered
unusable, the cost of relocating operations to a different frequency, and any other costs that
are directly attributable to the reclaiming of the frequency pursuant to this section." 47
U.S.C. § 926(c) (Supp. 1995). Where change is expected, a licensee may curtail
investments in capital and operating expenses to reflect a mature product with a limited
period within which to recover such incremental investments.
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and, therefore, more likely to reach a level which would induce a licensee
to switch frequencies. Regulations requiring frequency changes are more
likely to occur, as there is less spectrum capacity than under equivalent
scarcity and no scarcity circumstances and there is a comparatively greater
inducement for regulatory action to free up spectrum for a new technology
or higher valued use as with the NTIAO Amendments.
In sum, a market mechanism for electromagnetic spectrum allocation
and assignment will achieve greater social and economic utility under
conditions of either scarcity, no scarcity, or false scarcity by increasing the
efficiency, range, and effectiveness of usable spectrum.
